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Syrian Salvation Government

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Syrian Salvation Government
حكومة الإنقاذ السورية (Arabic)
Ḥukūmat al-ʾInqādh al-Sūriyya
Flag of حكومة الإنقاذ السوري
Flag
Coat of arms of حكومة الإنقاذ السوري
Coat of arms
Areas under control of various opposition groups as of November 2024      Syrian Salvation Government (Tahrir al-Sham)      Interim Government (National Army)      al-Tanf (Revolutionary Commando Army)
Areas under control of various opposition groups as of November 2024
     Syrian Salvation Government (Tahrir al-Sham)
     Interim Government (National Army)
     al-Tanf (Revolutionary Commando Army)
StatusUnrecognized quasi-state
CapitalIdlib
Largest cityAleppo
Official languagesArabic
Religion
Islam
GovernmentUnitary authoritarian technocratic Islamic state[1]
Emir of Tahrir al-Sham 
• 2017
Abu Mohammad al-Julani
Prime Minister 
• 2024
Mohammed al-Bashir
President[a] 
• 2020
Mustafa al-Mousa
LegislatureGeneral Shura Council
Population
• Estimate
4,000,000 (2023)
CurrencyTurkish lira[2][3] (TRY)
Website
syriansg.org

The Syrian Salvation Government (SSG; Arabic: حكومة الإنقاذ السورية, romanized: Ḥukūmat al-ʾInqādh al-Sūriyya) is a de facto alternative government of the Syrian opposition and unrecognized quasi-state formed in November 2017 by Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) during the Syrian civil war.[1] It controls much of northwest Syria, and had an estimated population of over 4,000,000 in 2023.[4] Its capital is Idlib and its largest city is Aleppo.

The SSG is a governed as an authoritarian[5] technocratic[6][7][8] Islamic state with two branches: the legislative General Shura Council and an executive headed by a prime minister.

Although HTS has declared its independence from the SSG, the SSG is widely regarded as either HTS's civilian administration or as being closely supported by it.[9][8] It has been described as the state-building project of HTS' leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani.[10][11]

Background

[edit]

Since 2014, large parts of Idlib Governorate, including Idlib city, in northwest Syria have been largely in the military control of the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front which would undergo various internal splits and power-struggles, eventually renouncing AQ ties in 2016 after forming Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS). In 2017, JFS merged with Jaysh al-Ahrar and four other rebel groups to form HTS.

HTS has since then engaged in fierce conflict with government forces, Hurras al-Din – the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda – and the Islamic State, in addition to sporadic conflicts with the Free Syrian Army. HTS does not recognise the authority of the official opposition leadership, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, or its recognised government, the Syrian Interim Government. However, HTS generally removed itself from the day-to-day governance of territories it held, leading to a form of dual power in which civil administration was carried out by co-operatively-run local councils.[12] Throughout 2017, HTS had been engaged in particularly intense armed conflict with rival rebel groups – see Idlib Governorate clashes (January–March 2017) and Idlib Governorate clashes (July 2017).

History

[edit]
Students of the Free Aleppo University in al-Dana protest against the closure of several faculties by the Syrian Salvation Government.

The General Syrian Conference, held in Idlib in September 2017, was a continuation of the Civil Administration Initiative in opposition-controlled areas, held at the end of August 2017 in Idlib.[13] At its conclusion on 11 September 2017, the Conference formed a constituent body named the General Shura Council, headed by president Bassam al-Sahyouni,[14] and appointed a prime minister. The Syrian Interim Government and the Syrian Democratic Forces in Qamishli and Afrin rejected the results of the conference.[13] Conference participants agreed upon "Islamic law as the only source of legislation", "the need to preserve the identity of the Syrian Muslim people", "the overthrow of the illegal regime with all its symbols and pillars and holding it accountable for its committed crimes, as well as liberating the Syrian territory from all the occupying forces, extending security and spreading justice in the liberated areas".[13]

The move was seen as part of an attempt by HTS to impose its control on the region.[13] Riad al-Asaad's attendance at the conference was controversial. Riad al-Asaad said that "HTS has previously declared that it will be dissolve itself, which is an external and internal demand", and that HTS "did not attend the conference and we did not communicate with them after it ended, either".[13] However, the Hawar Kilis Operations Room, part of the Syrian National Army, condemned Riad al-Asaad and accused him of conspiring with al-Qaeda.[15]

In early November 2017, the General Conference formed the SSG.[1] There followed weeks of conflict between the new government and the Syrian Interim Government (SIG), with reports of HTS unilaterally disbanding several SIG-supported local councils across northwestern Syria.[1]

On 12 December 2017, the SSG issued a warning that called for the Syrian Interim Government to evacuate their offices from opposition-controlled areas in 72 hours.[16][1] There were reports that some SIG-run local councils had already been closed, and replaced by SSG-loyal alternatives, but others said they would not vacate their offices.[1]

On 6 January 2018, the Salvation Government declared control over the SIG-run Free Aleppo University and closed several faculties in al-Dana and Sarmada, north of Idlib, where almost 4,000 students studied. This resulted in protests by students and lecturers of the university against the group.[17][18]

Politics of Syrian opposition
Symbols
Constitution
Executive
Legislature
Administrative divisions
Political parties
Foreign relations

On 15 August 2018, the SSG's Founding Body accepted the oral resignation of Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sheikh after the kidnapping of a prominent health director. Although the director was ransomed for $100,000 USD, al-Sheikh had promised to resign if the Ministry of Interior failed to apprehend the captors within 24 hours.[19] On 18 August 2018, the Founding Body instructed Fawaz Hilal to form a new government with the deputy prime minister, Mohammed Jamal Shahoud, leading in the interim.[20] The SSG's Constitution Drafting Assembly appointed Fawaz Hilal as prime minister, alongside nine cabinet ministers, on 10 December 2018. Hilal and much of his cabinet maintained close ties with HTS.[21][22] During a government offensive on Idlib in May 2019, Hilal called upon Turkey to support the opposition.[23]

Tax increases, rising commodity prices and accusations that the SSG was establishing monopolies on key goods such as fuel led to protests between October and November 2019, with demonstrators chanting slogans against the SSG and Abu Mohammad al-Julani.[24][25] After residents of Kafr Takharim refused to pay a new tax on olive oil and expelled SSG officials, HTS besieged and bombed the town, killing 5.[26] Hilal and his cabinet resigned shortly afterwards, leading to the Shura Council asking Ali Keda, Deputy Minister of the Interior for Administrative Affairs and Public Relations, to form a new government.[27] On 18 November 2019, Keda was elected prime minister by the Council, winning 65% of the vote.[28] However, some activists said the reshuffle was merely "changing faces".[29]

On 23 March 2020, the SSG created an emergency committee to coordinate its response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Syria. Measures taken by the SSG to prevent the spread of COVID-19 included suspending Friday prayers, shutting down schools and markets and opening quarantine centres in Jisr al-Shughur, Sarmada and Kafr Karmin. However, these efforts were undermined by hardliners from HTS and al-Qaeda's Syrian branch, the Guardians of Religion Organization, who continued to pray and hold sermons in mosques without social distancing. The SSG possessed limited resources to deal with a large outbreak of COVID-19, with only 107 ventilators and 243 intensive care unit beds at its disposal.[30]

On 7 April 2020, Bassam al-Sahyouni, president of the General Shura Council, resigned.[31] Sources told Enab Baladi that his resignation was in response to attempts by HTS to interfere in the Council's activities. On 24 April 2020, the Council elected Mustafa al-Mousa, a pharmacist who previously headed its health committee, as his successor.[32]

In May 2020, rapid depreciation of the Syrian pound triggered by the US Government's Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act prompted the SSG to replace it with the Turkish lira in its administered territories.[33]

On 1 December 2020, Ali Keda was re-elected as prime minister for another term by the General Shura Council, receiving 81% of the vote. The appointment was criticized by opposition activists, who likened it to elections in territories controlled by the Ba'athist regime.[34] In May 2023, Rojava and SSG announced separate proposals to host millions of Syrian refugees stranded across the neighboring countries, following Arab League's readmission of the Assad government.[35]

In his speech during the Eid al-Adha celebrations in July 2022, al-Julani described the SSG as "an important stage in the history of the Syrian revolution. It is a transition from the chaotic situation in which the liberated areas were toward organization."[36]

After formal diplomatic talks in July 2023, the SSG concluded an agreement with AANES to begin trading fuel supplies between Rojava and Idlib. The meetings had been conducted amid growing tensions between Turkey and SDF, and SDF's intention to deploy HTS as a check on the growing Turkish influence in northern Syria. For their part, the SSG proposed joint counter-terrorism efforts alongside SDF. The talks also involved negotiations on political arrangements, such as the prospects for a joint SSG-Rojava civil administration in the event of potential expulsion of SNA forces from northern Syria.[37]

In July 2023, the SSG launched "Syria Phone", the first communication and internet services company in Idlib. The state-owned company announced that it would provide "cellular calls, SMS, 4G internet service and video calls."[38]

On January 13 2024, the Shura Council elected Minister of Development and Humanitarian Affairs Mohammed al-Bashir as prime minister, succeeding Ali Keda.[39] His election platform focused on e-government and government automation.[40]

In March 2024, the Ministry of Interior said it would form a three-judge panel 'security court' for the families of detainees following demonstrations in Idlib due to the death of military personnel in prison and dissatisfaction at HTS influence. The Ministry of Interior also announced an amnesty for detainees "under certain conditions and exceptions" and established a 'General Security Administration' under its purview.[41]

In November 2024, HTS-led rebel groups launched the Northwestern Syria offensive, capturing Aleppo city and bringing it under the control of the SSG. The SSG reactivated its inter-ministerial emergency response committee to coordinate its expansion into the new territories. The committee prepared tents for new IDPs displaced by bombing, coordinated the transfer of 100,000 loaves of bread from Idlib's bakeries to Aleppo city, and dispatched rubble removal and street cleaning teams.[42] Drones dropped SSG leaflets on government positions which exhorted troops to desert or defect, and contained contact details for the SSG's "Center for Safety and Defection".[42]

Government and politics

[edit]

Legislature

[edit]

The General Shura Council is the legislative body of the SSG. It is responsible for electing a prime minister and approving ministerial appointments, drafting laws and presenting them for implementation to the executive branch, and ratifying the executive's plans.[43] The Council is charged with forming specialized committees which oversee and scrutinize the work of the executive.[43][44]

The Council is comprised from representatives of the various "segments" of society;[43] each elects 15 members to the Council. These segments include trade unions, tribes, internally displaced people and local residents.[44] Women are not permitted to vote in Council elections.[5] In April 2024, the Council announced the selection of an eight-member Higher Election Committee[b] to determine a new electoral process and delineate electoral districts for future elections.[44][45] The Committee is reportedly considering giving representation to women, local councils, minorities and the military.[44]

Executive

[edit]

The prime minister is elected by the Shura Council. Candidates for prime minister are nominated by council members; a minimum of 10 members must support a nomination for it to advance to the voting stage. In the event only one candidate continues to the voting stage, they must obtain two-thirds of Council's vote to be elected; otherwise, the candidate with the most votes wins.[44] Once elected, the prime minister must present his cabinet to the Council for approval within 30 days. Prime ministers are elected for one year terms: the first term is a "trial year", after which the Council may elect them for second and third terms.[44]

Both prospective prime ministerial and ministerial candidates must be Syrian, hold a university degree, be married to a Syrian, not be convicted of a crime, have a "good reputation" and possess a "revolutionary history".[44] Women hold few positions in the SSG's government, being confined to the Women's Office. As of July 2024, female leadership was absent from 10 of the SSG's 11 ministries, and no woman had ever been granted a ministerial portfolio.[46]

Ministries

[edit]

The SSG consists of eleven technocratic ministries, four general directorates (sports and youth, petroleum, real estate, human resources), three public bodies (Public Telecommunications Corporation, the Public Transport Corporation and the Central Authority for Control and Inspection) and a General Secretariat for Administrative and Legal Affairs. The majority of the SSG's revenue comes from the HTS, imports from Bab al-Hawa border crossing and taxation. The salvation government was able to withdraw powers from local councils to central ministries, deploy a General Directorate of Checkpoints for areas under its control and establish a military college.[43]

In 2017 Mohammed al-Sheikh was initially appointed as prime minister, with founder of the Free Syrian Army, Col. Riad al-Asaad as deputy prime minister for military affairs alongside eleven other ministers; Interior, Justice, Endowment, Higher Education, Education, Health, Agriculture, Economy, Social Affairs and Displaced, Housing and Reconstruction and Local Administration and Services.[43] Al-Sheikh, in a press conference held at the Bab al-Hawa Border Crossing also announced the formation of four commissions: Inspection Authority, Prisoners and Missing Persons Affairs, Planning and Statistics Authority, and the Commission of Trade Unions.[citation needed] After the appointment of Fawaz Hilal as prime minister in December 2018, the Ministry of Economy was merged with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction was merged with the Ministry of Local Administration and Services.[22]

List of prime ministers

[edit]
No. Name Took office Left office
1 Mohammed al-Sheikh 2 November 2017[47] 18 August 2018[19]
2 Mohammed Jamal Shahoud (acting) 18 August 2018[20] 10 December 2018
3 Fawaz Hilal 10 December 2018[21][22]
4 Ali Abdulrahman Keda 18 November 2019 2024
5 Mohammed al-Bashir 13 January 2024[48] Incumbent

Seventh cabinet (2024)

[edit]
Incumbent Office Since Until Ref
Mohammed al-Bashir Prime Minister 13 January 2024[48] Incumbent [49]
Fadi al-Qassem Ministry of Development 28 February 2024 Incumbent
Mohammad Abdul Rahman Ministry of Interior 28 February 2024 Incumbent
Shadi al-Waisi Ministry of Justice 28 February 2024 Incumbent
Hussam Haj Hussein Ministry of Awqaf 28 February 2024 Incumbent
Abdel Moneim Abdel Hafez Ministry of Higher Education 28 February 2024 Incumbent
Nazir al-Qadri Ministry of Education 28 February 2024 Incumbent
Mazen Dukhan Ministry of Health 28 February 2024 Incumbent
Basil Abdul Aziz Ministry of Economy 28 February 2024 Incumbent
Mohammad Al-Omar Ministry of Information 28 February 2024 Incumbent
Mohammad Al-Ahmad Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation 28 February 2024 Incumbent
Mohamed Muslim Ministry of Local Administration 28 February 2024 Incumbent

Administrative divisions

[edit]

The SSG's local municipal councils are organized as the Administration of the Liberated Areas (ALA).[10] The ALA is administratively divided into eight regions: Central, Northern, Sarmada, Harem, Jisr ash-Shughur, Ariha, Atme and Idlib.[44][50]

Foreign relations

[edit]

While no country recognizes the SSG as a sovereign state or a legitimate government of Syria, its Department of Political Affairs (DPA) conducts diplomatic outreach. On 29 December 2024, the DPA issued a statement that called on Russia to end its support for the Syrian government and that it seeks to "build positive relations based on mutual respect and common interests with all countries of the world, including Russia." It issued a similar statement directed to Iraq, amid rumors that Iraqi militias were planning to enter Syria to fight with government forces.[10]

Economy

[edit]

Prior to the capture of Aleppo during the 2024 Northwestern Syria offensive, the territories controlled by the SSG in Idlib Governorate were primarily rural. The poor level of infrastructure in the region was further degraded by the civil war, which destroyed oil production facilities, power plants and agricultural silos.[51]

In a 2022 speech, al-Julani stated his desire to see the SSG's "rate of exports [become] greater than [its] rate of imports" and to encourage industrial development by simplifying planning laws.[11] Through its Local Product Protection Department, the SSG's Ministry of Industry has adopted a protectionist policy of imposing tariffs on imports that compete with domestically produced goods. However, tariffs on imported raw materials and high energy costs mean that domestic production is unable to compete with imports in practice.[52] Weak domestic demand has also limited industrial development, although some pharmaceutical factories have been established.[52]

The currency of the SSG is the Turkish lira, which officially replaced the Syrian pound in June 2020 after it sharply depreciated in value. Usage of the Syrian pound has been criminalized.[53] The Turkish lira crisis raised the cost of imports, leading to increased unemployment, inflation and commodity prices,[54] and severely affecting economic activity.[55] The SSG operates a "General Monetary Agency for Cash Management and Consumer Protection" which regulates foreign exchange rates, hawala services and currency exchange firms.[56] It also operates Sham Bank, a financial institution that is the primary supplier of the lira in its territories.[56]

Sanctions prevent the population of the SSG from accessing international banking services.[57] Access to finance is generally limited to international grants, investments made by opposition groups and remittances from the Syrian diaspora.[51] To circumvent these restrictions, both opposition groups and civilians have turned to exchanging cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Tether. Cryptocurrency stores operate in Idlib and Sarmada. HTS has encouraged their usage, declaring cryptocurrencies as shariah-compliant and describing Bitcoin as the "Currency of the Future Economy".[58]

The SSG's General Authority of Zakat manages the collection of zakat, the Islamic alms-tax, from Muslims living under its administration. Failing to pay the zakat is illegal and can lead to arrest and imprisonment.[59]

Agriculture

[edit]

Agriculture in the SSG's territories is not mechanized. Olive harvesting is the main source of employment for day laborers in Idlib Governorate, and in 2020 agriculture was the primary income source for 36% of households.[60] Both drought and groundwater depletion, exacerbated by illegal drilling and an influx of internally displaced persons into the region, has led to increasing production costs.[60]

The SSG's Ministry of Agriculture manages agricultural affairs and encourages the cultivation of strategic crops, such as wheat and potatoes.[61] It maintains seed testing laboratories and produces seeds that are distributed to farmers.[60] In 2023, the ministry produced and distributed 4,600 kilograms of cottonseed to farmers in an attempt to restart cotton cultivation in the region, which fell into decline after the reduction of government subsidies in 2007, and increase female employment.[60]

The Ministry of Economy imposes price controls on wheat.[62] In search of higher profits, farmers increasingly plant crops not traditionally cultivated in the region, including saffron, strawberries, bananas, broccoli and Damask roses, but such enterprises remain small and experimental.[61]

Energy

[edit]

Most electricity in the SSG's territories is supplied from Turkey by the Green Energy Company,[63] the local franchise of a Turkish firm of the same name.[64] Electricity distribution is managed by the SSG's General Electricity Corporation. In May 2021, the Green Energy Company completed the construction of electrical substations capable of receiving 66kV from Turkey.[63] Transmission lines connect the substations in Reyhanlı in Turkey and Harem in Idlib.[65] By May 2023, over 70% of areas under the SSG's administration were connected to the electrical grid. Areas not connected to the grid rely on diesel generators and solar panels.[65] The Green Energy Company maintains an effective monopoly on the supply of electricity and has been accused by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights of unduly raising prices.[66]

Military and law enforcement

[edit]

While the SSG does not have a defense ministry, HTS effectively functions as such. Despite this, the SSG opened a military college in December 2021, whose purpose was described by al-Julani as to "[increase] the experience of the mujahidin in military science and martial arts."[67] Over 400 officers graduated from its first course in 2022.[68]

The SSG operates a police force under the Ministry of Interior. A police academy was opened in September 2023 and produced its first batch of graduates in August 2024.[69][70]

In 2024, the interior ministry absorbed two security agencies of HTS after a prisoner abuse scandal led to a protest movement,[71] and al-Julani admitting that HTS had used torture to extract false confessions from prisoners.[72] HTS' General Security Service was transferred to the interior ministry in April 2024,[73] followed by its Public Security Service in June.[74]

Education

[edit]

The SSG's Ministry of Education supervises the formal schooling system in Idlib, with more than 550,000 students, 1,800 schools and 12 universities as of 2022. These include approximately 950 schools directly operated by the ministry and employing nearly 12,500 staff members, in addition to the private education system authorized by the SSG. The curriculum is a continuation of the pre-2011 Syrian syllabus developed in partnership with UNICEF, with the exception of texts related to the Assad regime or deemed as contradicting the Sharia.[75][76]

Education has been severely disrupted by airstrikes on educational facilities and a lack of funding.[77] In 2022, al-Julani stated that 200,000 people in the SSG's territories had dropped out of school, warning this could lead to "illiteracy that leads to ignorance, which is a precursor to crime, unemployment, begging, and many other things."[78]

In September 2024, the White Helmets reported that 170 schools had been bombed since 2019. In October 2023, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that at least 1 million of the 2.2 million school-aged children in the region were not in education. In 2024, OCHA stated that a decline in international funding had deprived 700 schools of resources, affecting 110,000 students and 6,500 teachers.[77]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
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  2. ^ Consists of Essam Al-Khalif (Chairman), Ali Sultan (Deputy), Mohamed Ragheb, Mohamed Mahmoud Al-Zein, Abdul Ghani Sahari, Abdul Nasser Al-Youssef and Abdul Qader Ghazal.
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